September 24, 2026
Cigna is teaming up with OpenAI to build out more personalized supports for individuals with complex conditions, starting with a focus on cancer patients.
This article was originally published on Fierce Healthcare.
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September 24, 2026
Cigna is teaming up with OpenAI to build out more personalized supports for individuals with complex conditions, starting with a focus on cancer patients.
This article was originally published on Fierce Healthcare.
September 24, 2026
UnitedHealth Group has named Jodee Kozlak to the newly-created role of chief administrative officer, the healthcare giant announced Thursday morning.
This article was originally published on Fierce Healthcare.
Author: Ryan Greiner, MD | September 24, 2026
Today I’m going to briefly focus on the timely notification of an organization determination, and the new rules effective since the start of this year.
Here’s the scenario. A Medicare Advantage (MA) member is admitted. The hospital notifies the plan on time. And then – nothing. Days go by. The patient improves, goes home, and only then does the plan’s determination show up. Often, it’s a denial of the inpatient level of care.
Providers are seeing more of these late determinations on concurrent inpatient stays. And timing is not a technicality. When the decision arrives after discharge, the patient has lost the expedited appeal meant to protect them while they were still in the bed, and the hospital is chasing payment for care it already delivered.
So, what does the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) actually require? The rules are clearer than the reality.
It’s all in 42 CFR Part 422, Subpart M. Section 422.566 says every MA organization must have a pair of procedures for timely organization determinations. Not one – two: a standard track and an expedited track for when waiting could seriously jeopardize the enrollee’s life, health, or ability to regain maximum function.
On the standard track, as of Jan. 1, services subject to prior authorization get seven calendar days. It used to be 14.
On the expedited track, section 422.572, the plan has 72 hours to decide and to notify the enrollee and the physician, whether it’s favorable or adverse. A plan can extend that, but it has to tell you, and it has to serve the patient.
Case managers and physician advisors, remember this. In the 2026 Final Rule – CMS-4208-F, published in April 2025 – CMS said plainly that for pre-service or concurrent review of inpatient services, the facts will often satisfy the medical exigency standard. Translation: CMS expects concurrent inpatient reviews to be expedited in most cases. The same rule confirmed that a decision made during the stay is an organization determination with full appeal rights, and it barred plans from reopening an approved admission, except for obvious error or fraud.
Now, the kicker: Section 422.572, paragraph (f). If the plan fails to give timely notice of an expedited determination, that failure itself constitutes an adverse organization determination, and it may be appealed. Silence is a denial. And a denial can be appealed.
Three things to do the morning after such a scenario arises.
I’ll close with the patient. The patient who gets a denial in the mail two weeks after discharge is often the one with no caregiver, limited health literacy, and no capacity to fight it. A timely determination isn’t paperwork.
It’s a patient protection. Let’s hold the plans to it.
Regulatory References
42 C.F.R. § 422.566 — Responsibilities of the MA organization: standard and expedited procedures for organization determinations.
42 C.F.R. § 422.568(b) — Standard timeframe: 7 calendar days for services subject to prior authorization (effective January 1, 2026); 14 calendar days otherwise.
42 C.F.R. § 422.570 — Expediting certain organization determinations (medical exigency standard).
42 C.F.R. § 422.572(a), (b), (f) — Expedited determination within 72 hours; extension of up to 14 calendar days when in the enrollee’s interest; failure to provide timely notice is itself an adverse organization determination and may be appealed.
CMS-4208-F, Contract Year 2026 Policy and Technical Changes to the Medicare Advantage Program, 90 Fed. Reg. 15910 (April 15, 2025) — concurrent-review decisions are organization determinations with appeal rights; approved inpatient admissions may be reopened only for obvious error or fraud; CMS expects expedited handling of most concurrent inpatient reviews.
This article was originally published on RACmonitor.
September 23, 2026
Health tech company CertifyOS is launching a new national model for provider credentialing, with several major payers already on board as participants.
This article was originally published on Fierce Healthcare.
Author: Cheryl Ericson, RN, MS, CCDS, CDIP | September 21, 2026
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) finalized the Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement Expanded Model (CJR-X) in the Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS) Final Rule for the 2027 fiscal year (FY) on July 31. Starting Jan. 1, 2028, most acute-care hospitals paid under both IPPS and the Outpatient Prospective Payment System (OPPS) will be mandatorily accountable for a 90-day episode of care built around every hip, knee, and ankle replacement they perform, whether the anchor procedure happens in the inpatient or outpatient setting. More than 2,500 hospitals are expected to be included in the mandatory model.
The rollout of CJR-X is occurring while CMS is eliminating the Medicare Inpatient-Only List, providing a glimpse of what may be in store for hospitals in the years to come. Total knee and total hip arthroplasty came off the IPO List in 2018 and 2020, respectively, and inpatient volume for those procedures has fallen. The Chief Actuary’s Aug. 21, 2026 certification memo confirms that as of 2024, a total of 86 percent of knee procedures were performed in an outpatient setting or in an Ambulatory Surgery Center (ASC), and 61 percent of hip procedures were performed outside the inpatient setting.
In other words, joint replacement is no longer confined to a single site of service. A Medicare beneficiary can have a hip or knee replaced as a hospital inpatient, as a hospital outpatient, or in a freestanding ASC. Three sites, three payment mechanisms, and, as of 2028, one 90-day accountability window that follows the patient through whichever door they walked in.
This is where clinical documentation integrity (CDI) departments should start paying attention, because CJR-X does not treat those three sites the same way. Only the inpatient and hospital-outpatient anchor events trigger a CJR-X episode. For inpatient anchors specifically, CJR-X reconciles against a target price built from MS-DRG 469, 470, 521, and 522, the same DRGs that have always captured joint replacement, but the population landing in those DRGs is not the population it used to be.
Once a healthy 68-year-old with osteoarthritis and no meaningful comorbidity burden can have a knee replaced in an ASC or as same-day hospital outpatient surgery, that patient has very little clinical reason to occupy an inpatient bed. What remains for inpatient status are the patients who are not medically cleared to go home the same day. This may include patients with a Charlson Comorbidity Index of 2 or higher, uncontrolled diabetes, significant cardiopulmonary disease, morbid obesity, or a history of complications with anesthesia. The procedure got easier to perform outpatient, so those who need an inpatient bed are by definition the ones who were always going to be harder to keep complication-free.
That concentration of risk is not a side effect of CJR-X. It is the exact variable the model is trying to price correctly. The original CJR Model risk-adjusted its target prices using three factors. CJR-X uses 29 factors, including a count of specific Hierarchical Condition Category (HCC) flags at the beneficiary level. CMS built an expanded risk-adjustment methodology, in its own words, so that hospitals are not penalized for beneficiaries who are complex or for whom care is unpredictably complicated. That is a meaningful improvement over the original model’s three adjusters, and it is also functionally an admission that the remaining inpatient joint replacement population is going to look sicker – not because care has gotten worse, but because the easy cases have already migrated to the outpatient setting.
That timing detail is not lost on physician advisors, either. Ronald Hirsch, MD, pointed out on RACmonitor last week that CJR-X’s target price for its first performance years is built from a rolling baseline running from 2023 through 2027. Whether or not a given hospital is thinking about it in those terms, the discharge-planning and post-acute utilization decisions being made on today’s inpatient joint replacement patients are quietly setting the bar that CDI and utilization review will be held to three years from now, which means the documentation trail those decisions leave behind starts mattering before performance year one ever begins.
Here is the problem for hospitals, and the opportunity for CDI: those 29 risk adjusters only work if the comorbidities and HCC categories driving them are captured in the claims data. A hospital can have a genuinely excellent surgeon and a complex, high-risk inpatient joint replacement population, and still get penalized at reconciliation if the documentation does not support the acuity that justified the inpatient admission in the first place. Under CJR-X, undercoding a comorbidity is not just a lost HCC on a risk-adjustment model somewhere upstream; it directly understates the target price a hospital is measured against for that specific 90-day episode, and it weakens the medical necessity record for the admission decision itself, at a moment when payers are already scrutinizing inpatient joint replacement status more aggressively than almost any other elective procedure.
CDI’s job under CJR-X, then, is not fundamentally different from CDI’s job anywhere else, but the stakes attached to getting it right are higher and more concentrated. Query for the comorbidities that justified inpatient status, rather than letting “TKA, elective” stand alone, as if the DRG assignment settles the question. Make sure an unstable comorbidity shows up in the record in terms that map to a reportable code, not just in a preoperative risk-assessment note that never gets translated into the discharge summary. Capture complications with the same rigor CDI has always applied to present-on-admission status, since CJR-X’s 90-day window makes every readmission and every post-acute utilization decision part of the same financial episode as the surgery. None of this is new CDI methodology. It is the same clinical validation and specificity work CDI has always done, redirected at a population that is about to become smaller, sicker, and far more visible to hospital finance.
A shrinking, high-acuity inpatient joint replacement population is not a problem CDI created, and it is not one CDI can solve by working harder at the same tasks. It is solved by making sure that when a patient is sick enough to need an inpatient bed for a hip or knee replacement in 2028, the record proves it just as convincingly as the surgeon’s judgment already did. This is yet another way the relationship between utilization review, which assists with patient status, and CDI need to collaborate to support revenue integrity.
This article was originally published on RACmonitor.
Author: Penny Jefferson, MSN, RN, CCDS, CCDS-O, CCS, CDIP, CRC, CHDA, CRCR, CPHQ, ACPA-C | September 21, 2026
UnitedHealthcare’s (UHC’s) plan to remove prior authorization requirements affecting roughly 1,700 procedure codes across its health plan products deserves a careful welcome. For patients, fewer approval steps could mean earlier access to needed services. For healthcare organizations, the change could reduce administrative work and prevent some authorization-related denials. From a clinical documentation integrity (CDI), revenue integrity, and denials perspective, however, its full value will depend on what happens between scheduling and final payment.
I view this as a potential mixed blessing, with an important qualification: continued payment risk does not prove that the payer intends to replace authorization denials with retrospective denials. We should welcome measurable relief while examining whether total administrative burden and payment disputes actually decline. That requires a broader assessment than simply counting the codes removed from an authorization list.
UnitedHealthcare first announced in May 2026 that it planned to eliminate an additional 30 percent of its remaining prior authorizations by the end of the year. At that time, UnitedHealthcare reported that prior authorization was required for approximately 2 percent of its medical services.
That distinction is important. A 30-percent reduction in prior authorization requirements does not mean that 30 percent of all healthcare services are suddenly becoming authorization-free.
UnitedHealthcare’s Sept. 1 announcement provided the next operational step. Beginning Oct. 1, 2026, the payer will eliminate 30 percent of prior authorization requirements for UnitedHealthcare commercial plans, Medicare Advantage (MA) plans, Community Plans, Individual Exchange plans, and Oxford plans. Independent reporting based on the released code lists places the overall number of affected procedure codes at roughly 1,700.
Neither the 30-percent figure nor the roughly 1,700 codes establishes the percentage of an individual hospital’s claims, patients, or revenue that will actually be affected.
The number of affected codes varies considerably by product. Independent reporting indicates that the bulk of codes removed are concentrated in commercial and individual plans, while Community Plan changes vary by state.
That variation reinforces why healthcare organizations need to understand their own payer mix and service utilization before estimating the operational impact.
UnitedHealthcare directs providers to use its Prior Authorization and Notification Tool to check patient benefits and prior authorization requirements. Before removing a scheduling checkpoint, organizations should identify the relevant plan, procedure, date of service, and setting, and then confirm the applicable requirements. A national headline cannot substitute for patient-specific verification.
I would ask financial clearance leaders to maintain an implementation record showing which requirements changed, when local systems were updated, and how exceptions will be escalated. Retaining the applicable notice and verification response can help resolve an authorization dispute later. Staff education should explain precisely which checks can stop and which remain necessary, including benefit verification and applicable notification requirements.
For services truly exempt from authorization, denials attributable solely to missing that authorization should decrease. Teams may spend less time gathering approval packets, checking request status, and rescheduling appointments while decisions are pending. Patients may experience fewer administrative interruptions.
Those are expected benefits to evaluate after implementation, rather than outcomes already demonstrated by the announcement.
Authorization, coverage, and payment are related but separate determinations. UnitedHealthcare’s 2026 Care Provider Administrative Guide makes clear that notification or prior authorization approval does not by itself ensure or authorize payment. Payment remains dependent on factors including the member’s coverage, provider eligibility and contractual agreement, claim requirements, and applicable state rules and MA policies.
Removing an authorization requirement therefore should not be interpreted as unconditional coverage or a guarantee that the submitted claim will be paid as billed.
UnitedHealthcare’s 2026 Summary of Changes to Advance Notification and Prior Authorization Requirements provides another important qualification. UHC states that although prior authorization requirements may be added, updated, or removed for certain codes, post-service determinations may still apply based on medical policies, local or national coverage determination criteria, and/or state fee schedule coverage.
That does not establish that retrospective denials will increase. It does establish why eliminating prior authorization should not be confused with eliminating all potential post-service review.
For leadership, this distinction also affects staffing decisions. I would avoid treating every hour potentially saved in authorization work as an immediately removable expense. First, determine whether the work actually disappears, moves to another department, or changes in complexity. Organizations can redirect demonstrated capacity toward documentation support, payment reconciliation, and other revenue-cycle activities after measuring what the new workflow actually requires.
The concern is understandable: fewer reviews before treatment could coexist with continued scrutiny after a claim arrives.
But this is where healthcare organizations must be disciplined about the distinction between risk and evidence.
The UHC announcement does not establish that the payer will increase medical necessity denials, clinical validation reviews, downcoding, or retrospective payment reductions, just because it eliminated these prior authorization requirements. Describing such an outcome as inevitable would turn a legitimate operational concern into an unsupported allegation about payer behavior.
A better question is: what happens to the affected claims after Oct. 1?
Organizations should track requests for medical records, initial denials, payment reductions, retrospective reviews, and later recoupments, where relevant. If patterns change, examine the underlying policies and actual cases before assigning a cause.
Tming alone cannot establish that prior authorization reform produced a new denial practice.
Existing emergency department downgrades and inpatient diagnosis disputes also belong in the broader organizational risk assessment. They should not automatically be presented as consequences of this code removal. Different services, products, reimbursement methodologies, and payer policies may be involved. Linking those issues responsibly requires evidence that the affected populations overlap, and that the disputed payment mechanism applies to them.
For CDI, I would emphasize documentation that explains why care was appropriate for this patient at this time.
The record should connect symptoms and findings to the clinician’s assessment, the selected intervention, and the response to treatment. Where relevant, it should explain prior treatment, unsuccessful alternatives, contraindications, or why a different approach was necessary.
Consider a hypothetical outpatient procedure for which authorization is no longer required. Scheduling may become easier, but a record containing only a diagnosis label and the procedure name may still leave the clinical rationale unclear. Documentation describing the patient’s functional limitations, relevant examination findings, and treatment history gives subsequent reviewers a more complete account of the clinical decision.
That example illustrates good documentation practice; it should not be interpreted as a new UHC review requirement.
Clinical validation requires similar precision. If an organization’s own data identifies disputes involving diagnoses such as sepsis, respiratory failure, malnutrition, acute kidney injury, encephalopathy, or shock, CDI can prioritize those areas based on demonstrated organizational risk. Their inclusion in a local review strategy should not imply that the UHC prior authorization announcement specifically targets those diagnoses.
Clarification should resolve uncertainty and conflicting evidence without encouraging unsupported severity language.
CDI should also coordinate with utilization management and physician advisors when the question concerns inpatient status or continued hospitalization. Procedure authorization, service medical necessity, diagnosis validity, and admission status answer different questions.
A successful response begins by identifying the actual issue. Sending a diagnosis-focused appeal to answer a status dispute, for example, may leave the payer’s stated rationale unaddressed.
Revenue integrity leaders should include paid claims in their assessment.
A claim can receive payment and still require investigation if the amount differs from the expected contractual reimbursement. Conversely, a difference between billed charges and payment does not by itself demonstrate an underpayment. The comparison must use the correct contract, reimbursement methodology, and claim circumstances.
I would pair denial reporting with targeted review of claim edits, service-level reductions, and payment variances for affected services. Coding can assess whether submitted codes and modifiers accurately represent the record. Revenue integrity can examine charges and reimbursement logic. Contracting can address disputed payment terms.
This division of responsibility helps organizations identify the correct remedy, rather than routing every payment variance to CDI.
Appeal performance should also include the resources required to achieve the result. An overturned denial can restore payment while still consuming significant clinical and administrative time.
Track days to resolution, dollars recovered, and staff effort, where feasible. Retain the denial rationale, relevant record evidence, applicable policy, and final disposition so recurring problems can inform prevention strategies and payer discussions.
Before October implementation, establish a baseline for the codes and plans actually affected.
Compare similar service periods after implementation, separating professional and facility claims when their payment structures differ. Account for changes in volume, patient complexity, contracts, and other payer policies. A comparison group of similar services with unchanged authorization requirements may help distinguish broader trends from changes concentrated in the exempt services.
Over the next six to 12 months, I would monitor authorization-related denials, medical necessity denials, clinical validation denials (where applicable), requests for medical records, appeal overturn rates, payment turnaround, underpayments and other payment variances, net reimbursement relative to expected payment, scheduling delays and cancellations related to approval processes, and staff time associated with authorization, denials, and appeals.
These measures allow leaders to determine whether patients and operational teams actually experience the intended relief.
Denominators deserve particular attention.
Consider a hypothetical baseline with 100 authorization denials and 50 medical necessity denials. Medical necessity represents one-third of those 150 denials.
If authorization denials subsequently fall to 25 while medical necessity denials remain at 50, medical necessity now represents two-thirds of the remaining 75 denials.
The percentage doubled, but the number of medical necessity denials did not increase at all.
That distinction will be critical when organizations evaluate the effect of the UHC changes. Report actual counts and rates among comparable claims alongside the distribution of denial reasons. Otherwise, a shift in the denominator could easily be mistaken for evidence of increased payer activity.
Organizations also need to allow claims and appeals sufficient time to mature before declaring the initiative a success or failure. A decline in authorization work may become visible almost immediately, while retrospective payment disputes and appeal outcomes may take months to emerge.
Separate preliminary results from final outcomes and maintain consistent definitions across reporting periods.
Review findings jointly with patient access, CDI, utilization management, coding, revenue integrity, contracting, physician advisors, and denials leaders so one department’s apparent improvement does not obscure additional work somewhere else in the revenue cycle.
Patient communication also deserves a defined owner. Staff should avoid telling patients that a service is “covered” simply because prior authorization is no longer required. Instead, explain what has been verified, identify unresolved benefit questions, and direct financial concerns to the appropriate team.
When data identifies recurring disputes, bring specific examples to the payer. Ask which policy supported the decision, whether the correct product and effective date were applied, and what information would resolve the issue. Aggregate findings can support focused discussions about erroneous edits, inconsistent application of policy, or unclear instructions.
Then continue monitoring. A payer response to an individual claim does not necessarily mean the underlying problem has been corrected across the affected population.
I welcome a reduction in unnecessary approval steps. The opportunity is meaningful if patients receive appropriate care sooner and providers spend less time navigating avoidable administrative requirements.
But removing a prior authorization requirement is only the beginning of the story.
The more meaningful question is: what happens across the entire continuum, from scheduling and access, through clinical documentation and claim submission, to adjudication, payment, and, when necessary, appeal?
Accurate documentation remains essential because it tells the clinical story behind the care delivered. Data will tell us whether the administrative story changed as well.
Healthcare leaders should measure both.
If patients receive care sooner, administrative workload falls, authorization-related denials decrease, and those gains persist through final payment, then this initiative will represent meaningful progress.
If the work simply moves somewhere else in the revenue cycle, our data should be sophisticated enough to recognize that too.
The measure of prior authorization reform should not simply be how many requirements disappear from a list. It should be whether the change reduced the total burden on the patients and healthcare teams those requirements were intended to serve.
1. UnitedHealth Group. UnitedHealthcare Cuts Prior Authorization Requirements by 30%. May 5, 2026.
2. UnitedHealthcare. Spend Less Time on Approvals and More Time With Patients. September 1, 2026.
https://www.uhcprovider.com/en/resource-library/news/2026/october-prior-auth-reductions.html
3. Minemyer P. UnitedHealthcare to Nix Prior Auth on 1,700 Services on Oct. 1. Fierce Healthcare. September 1, 2026.
https://www.fiercehealthcare.com/payers/unitedhealthcare-nix-prior-auth-1700-services-oct-1
4. UnitedHealthcare. 2026 Summary of Changes to Advance Notification and Prior Authorization Requirements. 2026.
5. UnitedHealthcare. 2026 Care Provider Administrative Guide. 2026.
This article was originally published on RACmonitor.
September 21, 2026
Aetna is expanding bundled prior authorizations across all types of cancer for enrollees in its Medicaid plans across eight states.
This article was originally published on Fierce Healthcare.
September 21, 2026
Nearly two thirds said their debt stemmed from hospital care, though many pointed to several accumulating bills rather than a single high-cost procedure for their burdens. Additionally, focus group participants described provider-recommended services that were unexpectedly denied by an insurer.
This article was originally published on Fierce Healthcare.
September 18, 2026
The pause that began Sept. 1 had triggered alarm bells from provider groups and prompted an appeal from Texas Governor Greg Abbott.
This article was originally published on Fierce Healthcare.
Author: Ronald Hirsch, MD, FACP, ACPA-C, CHCQM, CHRI | September 17, 2026
Let’s start today with a recent U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) notice about a fraudster who was paid almost $3 million by Medicare Advantage (MA) plans for durable medical equipment (DME) that was not ordered by a physician, needed by the patients, or even approved by the plan. Seriously, Medicare Advantage? You’ll pay a fraudster $3 million for DME you never approved, but you won’t pay hospitals for medically necessary inpatient admissions that meet the Two-Midnight Rule? Something is very wrong.
Next, I want to point out a major flaw in the upcoming Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement Expanded (CJR-X) program, starting in 2028. I was trying to understand how the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) was going to set the target rates for calculating savings, and realized that we are still in the baseline period for setting the target rate for the first four years of the program.
Now, why is that interesting? Well, hospitals will get to share in the savings if their 2028 spending is less than the target rate, which is calculated based on spending during a rolling period from 2023 to 2027. In other words, it is in your best interest to send as many total hip and knee replacement patients as possible to skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) and use as much home care and outpatient therapy as possible, so when January 2028 rolls around, you have lots of room to improve.
If you are working hard now to limit SNF use and optimize time receiving home care and outpatient therapy, then once the program starts, you’ll have little room to improve. And that means no shared savings for the program partners.
Now, should you game the system like this? Of course not, but CMS really needs to think about these programs that disadvantage those who are already high-performing.
Next, let me jump back to MA, this time singling out United HealthCare. They made headlines two weeks ago when they announced they were eliminating a large number of prior authorizations. Of course, they reveled in the adulation they received.
But the devil was in the details. If you went into the actual lists of procedures that will no longer need prior authorization, you will find that the lists are different for each type of plan. There are only 160 procedures coming off the MA list, with many of them relating to DME, but more than 800 coming off the commercial plan list.
They are not removing one single gastrointestinal procedure from the prior authorization list for MA patients. So, the physician office and hospital still have to determine what CPT® code is planned and check the specific list. And since the elderly need healthcare more than younger people, the burden reduction with this is less than impressive.
And finally, I direct my disappointment at both the Quality Improvement Organizations (QIOs). They are really underperforming. The first case reflecting this was an inpatient needing SNF care. The facility offered choice. Then, the second Important Message from Medicare (IMM) was delivered, the patient was stable enough to transfer, and they had an accepting facility, but the family wanted more time to visit other facilities, hoping to find a facility with private rooms. So, the patient appealed.
And the QIO sided with the patient, noting, “due to not yet finalizing a placement in an appropriate and safe SNF, it is reasonable to continue acute-care stay.”
Seriously? This facility is CMS-approved, and it can meet the patient’s needs, plus it has an open bed, but that’s not good enough for the QIO?
The hospital is submitting a complaint to CMS.
Then that same QIO denied a MA patient’s discharge appeal because although they were admitted as an inpatient, the MA plan told the QIO they were denying inpatient status, so the patient has no appeal rights. That patient was still an inpatient, and it seems inconceivable that they would lose their appeal rights every time the payer says “we won’t approve inpatient care.”
Both the provider and I have a question submitted to CMS to find out the actual interpretation.
And finally, a QIO recently sided with a patient on their discharge appeal simply because the discharge summary was not available. The patient has not yet left the hospital! How can they demand a discharge summary?
That is absolutely improper.
Yes, the rules are complex, but the QIO is supposed to be the expert and properly represent the patient. This is disappointing, to say the least.
This article was originally published on RACmonitor.